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Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

Listed author(s):
  • Doh-Shin Jeon
  • Domenico Menicucci

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

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File URL: https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/805.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 805.

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Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision: Aug 2005
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:805
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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