bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers
Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicing bundling. In this paper, we analyze how bundling affects journal pricing in the context of STM electronic journal market and offer a novel insight on the bundling of a large number of information goods. We find that (i) when bundling is prohibited, surprisingly, market structure does not affect prices (ii) when bundling is allowed, each publisher finds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit while reducing social welfare and (iii) any asymmetry-increasing merger is profitable but reduces social welfare
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
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