IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecm/feam04/720.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers

Author

Listed:
  • domenico menicucci
  • doh-shin jeon

Abstract

Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicing bundling. In this paper, we analyze how bundling affects journal pricing in the context of STM electronic journal market and offer a novel insight on the bundling of a large number of information goods. We find that (i) when bundling is prohibited, surprisingly, market structure does not affect prices (ii) when bundling is allowed, each publisher finds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit while reducing social welfare and (iii) any asymmetry-increasing merger is profitable but reduces social welfare

Suggested Citation

  • domenico menicucci & doh-shin jeon, 2004. "bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 720, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:720
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.26589.1080730616.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6313 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2001. "Free Labour for Costly Journals?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 183-198, Fall.
    3. Chemla, G., 1999. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Papers 99-18, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    4. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
    5. Mark Armstrong, 1999. "Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 151-168.
    6. Gilles Chemla & Gilles Chemla, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration," Post-Print halshs-00679847, HAL.
    7. repec:cdl:ucsbec:16-01 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1999. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(12), pages 1613-1630, December.
    9. Barry Nalebuff, 2004. "Bundling as an Entry Barrier," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 159-187.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2016. "Open Access as a Crude Solution to a Hold-up Problem in the Two-Sided Market for Academic Journals," NBER Working Papers 22220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2017. "The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 105-135, March.
    3. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2012. "Bundling and Competition for Slots," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1957-1985, August.
    4. Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2013. "Dominance and Competitive Bundling," TSE Working Papers 13-423, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Mueller-Langer, Frank & Watt, Richard, 2012. "Optimal pricing and quality of academic journals and the ambiguous welfare effects of forced open access: a two-sided model," MPRA Paper 40191, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2010. "The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 222-255, May.
    7. Choi, Jay Pil & Jeon, Doh-Shin, 2016. "A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets," TSE Working Papers 16-689, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2018.
    8. Armstrong, Mark, 2014. "Opening Access to Research," MPRA Paper 59731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Mark McCabe, 2004. "Information goods and endogenous pricing strategies: the case of academic journals," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(10), pages 1-11.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2004:i:10:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 558-581, June.
    12. Haucap, Justus & Loebert, Ina & Spindler, Gerald & Thorwarth, Susanne, 2016. "Ökonomische Auswirkungen einer Bildungs- und Wissenschaftsschranke im Urheberrecht," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 86, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    13. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2009. "Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling," IDEI Working Papers 574, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jul 2011.
    14. Mark Armstrong, 2010. "Collection Sales: Good Or Bad For Journals?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 163-176, January.
    15. Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2005. "Open Access and Academic Journal Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 453-459, May.
    16. Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2016. "Leveraging Dominance with Credible Bundling," CEPR Discussion Papers 11304, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2009. "Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing," Economics Working Papers 1168, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    18. Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "The Bundling of Academic Journals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 441-446, May.
    19. McCabe, Mark J. & Nevo, Aviv & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2006. "The Pricing of Academic Journals," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt13d1h835, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bundling; Site Licensing; Interconnection; Merger;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:720. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.