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Competitive Bundling

Author

Listed:
  • Jidong Zhou

Abstract

This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive (pure) bundling in an oligopoly market. We find that under fairly general conditions, relative to separate sales, bundling raises market prices, benefits firms, and harms consumers when the number of firms is above a threshold (which can be small). This is in contrast to the findings in the duopoly case on which the existing literature often focuses. Our analysis also sheds new light on how consumer valuation dispersion affects price competition more generally.

Suggested Citation

  • Jidong Zhou, 2017. "Competitive Bundling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 145-172, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:145-172
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    Cited by:

    1. Sang‐Hyun Kim & Jong‐Hee Hahn, 2022. "On the profitability of interfirm bundling in oligopolies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 657-673, August.
    2. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico & Nasr, Nikrooz, 2016. "Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability: On the Role of the Non-Negative Pricing Constraint," TSE Working Papers 16-691, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2020.
    3. de Cornière, Alexandre & Taylor, Greg, 2017. "Application Bundling in System Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 12129, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
    5. Shuai, Jie & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan, 2022. "Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 421-447.
    6. Zhou, Jidong, 2021. "Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    7. Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2020. "An empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Ilya Morozov & Stephan Seiler & Xiaojing Dong & Liwen Hou, 2021. "Estimation of Preference Heterogeneity in Markets with Costly Search," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 871-899, September.
    9. Zhou, Shu & Song, Boqian & Gavirneni, Srinagesh, 2020. "Bundling decisions in a two-product duopoly – Lead or follow?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 284(3), pages 980-989.
    10. Andrew Rhodes & Jidong Zhou, 2024. "Personalized Pricing and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(7), pages 2141-2170, July.
    11. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2025. "Occupational mismatch and market power," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    12. Raoul Kübler & Rouven Seifert & Michael Kandziora, 2021. "Content valuation strategies for digital subscription platforms," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 45(2), pages 295-326, June.
    13. Liu, Xingyi, 2022. "Competitive pricing and advertising with spillover," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    14. Angelika Endres-Fröhlich & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Joachim Heinzel, 2022. "The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market," Working Papers Dissertations 91, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    15. Sarat Kumar Jena & Abhijeet Ghadge, 2022. "Product bundling and advertising strategy for a duopoly supply chain: a power-balance perspective," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 315(2), pages 1729-1753, August.
    16. Innocenti, Federico & Menicucci, Domenico, 2021. "Partial compatibility in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 351-378.
    17. Yufeng Huang, 2022. "Tied Goods and Consumer Switching Costs," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 93-114, January.
    18. Iaria, Alessandro & ,, 2020. "Identification and Estimation of Demand for Bundles," CEPR Discussion Papers 14363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Tan, Guofu & Zhou, Junjie, 2024. "Consumer heterogeneity and inefficiency in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    20. Chen, Yongmin & Li, Jianpei, 2018. "Bundled procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 116-127.
    21. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
    22. Thanassoulis, John, 2018. "The I.O. of ethics and cheating when consumers do not have rational expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 13172, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, 2021. "Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power [Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly]," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(640), pages 3122-3144.
    24. Tang, Yuanzhao & Perera, Sandun C. & Cao, Qingning & Ji, Xiang, 2023. "Supplier versus platform bundling: Optimal strategies under agency selling," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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