Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
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Other versions of this item:
- G. Chemla, 1999. "Downstream competition, foreclosure, and vertical integration," THEMA Working Papers 99-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kai-Uwe Kuhn & Xavier Vives, 1999. "Excess Entry, Vertical Integration, and Welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 575-603.
More about this item
KeywordsMARKET STRUCTURE ; VERTICAL INTEGRATION ; ENTERPRISES;
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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