Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
This paper analyzes the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentives to vertically integrate when firms on both segments negotiate optimal contracts. The author argues that tougher competiton decreases the downstream industry profit, but improves the upstream firm's negotiation position.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.|
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- Kühn, Kai-Uwe & Vives, Xavier, 1995.
"Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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