Downstream competition, foreclosure, and vertical integration
This paper analyzes the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentives to vertically integrate when firms on both segments negotiate optimal contracts. The author argues that tougher competiton decreases the downstream industry profit, but improves the upstream firm's negotiation position.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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- Kai-Uwe Kuhn & Xavier Vives, 1999.
"Excess Entry, Vertical Integration, and Welfare,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 575-603, Winter.
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