Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots
An analysis of competition for scarce inputs, describing the outcome of an auction of takeoff and landing slots between two airline carriers and the possible outcomes from a merger or takeover wave. The results suggest that the concern over monopolization of airports may be misplaced.
Volume (Year): (1994)
Issue (Month): Q II ()
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