IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedcer/y1994iqiip18-25nv.30no.2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots

Author

Listed:
  • Ian Gale

Abstract

An analysis of competition for scarce inputs, describing the outcome of an auction of takeoff and landing slots between two airline carriers and the possible outcomes from a merger or takeover wave. The results suggest that the concern over monopolization of airports may be misplaced.

Suggested Citation

  • Ian Gale, 1994. "Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 30(Q II), pages 18-25.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1994:i:qii:p:18-25:n:v.30no.2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Review/1994/94-q2-gale.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?toc_id=43952&filepath=/docs/publications/frbclevreview/rev_frbclev_1994q2.pdf&start_page=19#scribd-open
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein, 1992. "The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 45-73, Spring.
    2. Gale, Ian L. & Stegeman, Mark, 2001. "Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 74-103, July.
    3. Krishna, Kala, 1993. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 147-160, March.
    4. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
    2. Huasheng Song & Ruqu Wang & Jianliang Ye, 2018. "Scarce human resources and equilibrium industry structure," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 99-119, June.
    3. James Reitzes & Brendan McVeigh & Nicholas Powers & Samuel Moy, 2015. "Competitive Effects of Exchanges or Sales of Airport Landing Slots," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(2), pages 95-125, March.
    4. Briggs, María Cristina & Petrecolla, Diego, 2001. "Problemas de competencia en la asignación de la capacidad de los aeropuertos. El Caso Argentino," UADE Textos de Discusión 24_2001, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
    2. Bruno Larue & Mohamed Jeddy & Sébastien Pouliot, 2013. "On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2013-4, CREATE.
    3. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2000. "Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-16, March.
    4. Crawford, Vincent P. & Kuo, Ping-Sing, 2003. "A dual Dutch auction in Taipei: the choice of numeraire and auction form in multi-object auctions with bundling," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 427-442, August.
    5. Bruno Larue & Sébastien Pouliot & Mohamed Jeddy, 2016. "On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 64(2), pages 289-310, June.
    6. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
    7. Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    8. Amir Ban & Ron Lavi, 2021. "Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 75-104, March.
    9. e Cunha, Luis Campos & Santos, Vasco, 1995. "Secondary markets in auctions with endogenous valuations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 307-311, June.
    10. David Ramos-Pérez & José Luis Sánchez-Hernández, 2014. "European World Cities and the Spatial Polarisation of Air Transport Liberalisation Benefits," Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    11. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1994. "Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result," Working Papers (Old Series) 9402, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    12. Franziska Voelckner, 2006. "An empirical comparison of methods for measuring consumers’ willingness to pay," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 137-149, April.
    13. Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Construction Contracts (or “How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?”)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1714, CESifo.
    14. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 4608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. John McMillan, 2003. "Market Design: The Policy Uses of Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 139-144, May.
    16. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    17. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Post-Print hal-01021718, HAL.
    18. Thomas D. Jeitschko, 1998. "Learning in Sequential Auctions," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 98-112, July.
    19. Ravi Bapna & Chrysanthos Dellarocas & Sarah Rice, 2010. "Vertically Differentiated Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(7), pages 1074-1092, July.
    20. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1994:i:qii:p:18-25:n:v.30no.2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: 4D Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.