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Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions

  • Jeddy, Mohamed
  • Larue, Bruno
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    We analyze the effects of mergers and the introduction of concurrent marketing mechanisms on the seller’s revenue, price trend and efficiency in sequential auctions under complete information with asymmetric bidders. First, we provide conditions for bidders to be strategic when the number of objects is less or greater than the number of bidders as this impacts upon the set of possible mergers. Second, we show that mergers may simultaneously increase the seller’s revenue and improve efficiency. Third, we show that having a marketing mechanism working alongside the auction can increase or decrease the average auction price. We use weekly data about Quebec’s daily hog auction to ascertain the effects of a merger and of changes in the weights of concurrent marketing mechanisms on daily auction prices. Our empirical analysis relies on an endogenous structural change test which detected three breaks corresponding to: i) the introduction of a new concurrent mechanism, ii) a joint-venture partnership of the two largest hog processing firms and iii) an announcement by Canada’s Competition Bureau authorizing the full merger of the same two firms.

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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/126945
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    Paper provided by Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA) in its series Working Papers with number 126945.

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    Date of creation: Feb 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:spaawp:126945
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://servsas.fsaa.ulaval.ca/index.php?id=12482&L=1

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    1. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
    2. Kala Krishna, 1999. "Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 377-391.
    3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:429-436 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    5. Yao, Yi-Ching, 1988. "Estimating the number of change-points via Schwarz' criterion," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 181-189, February.
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    7. Krishna, K., 1990. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," Papers 472, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    8. Mohamed Jeddy & Bruno Larue, 2012. "Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 456-465.
    9. Steven Heubeck & Donald J. Smythe & Jingang Zhao, 2006. "A Note on the Welfare Effects of Horizontal Mergers in Asymmetric Linear Oligopolies," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 7(1), pages 29-47, May.
    10. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March.
    11. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
    12. Mohamed Safouane Ben Aissa & Jamel Jouini, 2003. "Structural breaks in the US inflation process," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(10), pages 633-636.
    13. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
    14. Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, 1998. "Are Mega-Mergers Anticompetitive? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 803-827, Winter.
    15. Mohamed Jeddy & Bruno Larue & Jean-philippe Gervais, 2010. "Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 429-436.
    16. J. Jouini & M. Boutahar, 2003. "Structural breaks in the U.S. inflation process: a further investigation," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(15), pages 985-988.
    17. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
    18. Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-37, December.
    19. Steven Tschantz & Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb, 2000. "Mergers in Sealed versus Oral Auctions," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 201-212.
    20. BAI, Jushan & PERRON, Pierre, 1998. "Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural-Change Models," Cahiers de recherche 9807, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    21. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. " The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
    22. Mohamed Safouane Ben Aissa & Mohamed Boutahar & Jamel Jouini, 2004. "Bai and Perron's and spectral density methods for structural change detection in the US inflation process," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 109-115.
    23. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
    24. Katzman, Brett, 1999. "A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 77-99, May.
    25. Gale, Ian L & Hausch, Donald B & Stegeman, Mark, 2000. "Sequential Procurement with Subcontracting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 989-1020, November.
    26. Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
    27. Gale, Ian L. & Stegeman, Mark, 2001. "Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 74-103, July.
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