On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less
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- Larue, Bruno & Jeddy, Mohamed & Pouliot, Sébastien, 2013. "On The Number Of Bidders And Auction Performance: When More Means Less," Working Papers 156465, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
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More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; Livestock; Competition; Price;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-09-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2013-09-06 (Experimental Economics)
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