Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities : Vickrey Versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction
We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a supersetof combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packagesthat are contingent on the whole nal assignment. Without externalities,the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction areboth robust if items are perceived as substitutes. Such an equivalencebetween those formats may not hold with externalities and theanalog of the substitute condition is a complex unexplored issue. Weanalyse those issues in the Negative Group-Dependent Externalitiesframework, a general structure with allocative externalities betweenjoint-purchasers.
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