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The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts

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  • Laurent Lamy

    (Crest)

Abstract

We slightly modify the Ausubel-Milgrom [3] Proxy Auction byadding a final stage which possibly induces some discounts relativeto the final accepted bids of the 'original' auction. The proxy auctionwith final discounts is such that the outcome is a point in the bidderoptimal frontier of the Core. Then truthful reporting is an equilibriumif and only if the Vickrey outcome is in the Core, a condition that isnecessary but not sufficient in the original version of the proxy auctionas illustrated by an example.

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  • Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-25
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    Cited by:

    1. Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
    2. Thomas Rieck, 2009. "Risk and Expected Utility Theory," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2009, University of Bonn, Germany.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey vs. the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," 2007 Meeting Papers 427, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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