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On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects

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  • Sven de Vries
  • James Schummer

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Sven de Vries & James Schummer, 2005. "On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects," 2005 Meeting Papers 389, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed005:389
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 437-450.
    2. Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Papers of Peter Cramton 98cra2, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
    3. Marshall L. Fisher, 1981. "The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1-18.
    4. Marcel Fafchamps & Agnes R. Quisumbing, 1999. "Human Capital, Productivity, and Labor Allocation in Rural Pakistan," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, pages 369-406.
    5. Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, pages 1-44.
    6. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 863-872.
    7. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1452-1475.
    8. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1483-1504.
    9. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Ascending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 745-756.
    10. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1191-1220.
    11. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 727-736, October.
    12. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 377-406.
    13. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2000. "The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 66-95.
    14. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 371-385.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vickrey auctions; multi-item auctions; combinatorial auctions;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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