An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders
An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but might face a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his values. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist. We develop a novel dynamic auction and prove that the auction always ï¬nds a core allocation. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector and is Pareto efficient.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom|
Phone: (0)1904 323776
Fax: (0)1904 323759
Web page: http://www.york.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2001.
"High Bids and Broke Winners,"
Staff General Research Papers
12665, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 1989.
"Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
201, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 2006. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-230, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-342, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2000.
"Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April.
- Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank.
- Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Auctions: Theory and Practice,"
Online economics textbooks,
SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2009.
"A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions,"
2009-W11, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2010. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 537-547, 04-05.
- Erdil, Aytek & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer & Aytek Erdil, 2009. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 2009-W11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2008. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, 03.
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
- Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2009. "A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 933-952, 05.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Robert Day & Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Core-selecting package auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 393-407, March.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
- Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Paper 2011-096, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004.
"Putting Auction Theory to Work,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, 1.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice
[Auctions: Theory and Practice]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
- Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:13/31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Hodgson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.