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A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

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  • Hafalir, Isa E.
  • Ravi, R.
  • Sayedi, Amin

Abstract

In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer. We also show that ex-post Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near Pareto optimal in the sense that all full winnersʼ values are above all full losersʼ values.

Suggested Citation

  • Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin, 2012. "A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 699-708.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:699-708
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Ashlagi Itai & Braverman Mark & Hassidim Avinatan & Lavi Ron & Tennenholtz Moshe, 2010. "Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-32, May.
    8. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Robert, Jacques, 1996. "Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 181-186, August.
    10. Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
    3. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian & Kim, Jinwoo, 2013. "Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 659-665.
    4. A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
    5. Le, Phuong, 2014. "Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints," MPRA Paper 66384, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Le, Phuong, 2018. "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    7. Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
    8. Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2018. "Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints," Discussion Papers 18/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    10. Labrini Zarpala, 2023. "Auctioning Corporate Bonds: A Uniform-Price under Investment Mandates," Papers 2306.07134, arXiv.org.
    11. Baisa, Brian, 2016. "Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 23-35.
    12. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
    13. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020. "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 386-405.
    14. Selcuk, Cemil, 2017. "Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 262-285.
    15. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
    16. Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2018. "Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 18/09, Department of Economics, University of York.
    17. Phuong Le, 2017. "Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(1), pages 1-31, March.
    18. SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2023. "Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-136, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vickrey auctions; Budget constraints;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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