On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints
We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders and we investigate its properties. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endownments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two mechanisms is generally not possible.
|Date of creation:||23 Apr 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104|
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003.
"Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 395-409, November.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2003. "Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions," Economics Working Papers 0031, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003.
"Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data,"
03002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
- Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Athey, Susan & Haile, Philip A., 2007. "Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 60 Elsevier.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-294, March.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
- Leininger, Wolfgang, 1991. "Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 146-172, February.
- Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2003. "On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 374-392, June.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1999.
"First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-142, February.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1997. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," Cahiers de recherche 9715, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005.
"Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 95-118, March.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," MPRA Paper 6102, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Castro, Luciano I. de, 2007. "Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we074622, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Game Theory and Information
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:12-019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dolly Guarini)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.