The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
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- Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Li, Fei, 2014. "The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information," Scholarly Articles 12559696, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsWar of attrition; Budget constraints; Linkage principle; Auctions; Information disclosure; Contests;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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