Caps In Sequential Contests
We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is pro?table for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.
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- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998.
"Caps on Political Lobbying,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
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