Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information
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- Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
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- Archishman Chakraborty, 2002. "Optimal Price Ceilings in a Common Value Auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(7), pages 1-7.
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Cited by:
- Szech, Nora, 2015. "Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 138-149.
- Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2014.
"Caps In Sequential Contests,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 608-617, April.
- Sela, Aner & Megidish, Reut, 2010. "Caps in Sequential Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 7874, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aner Sela & Reut Megidish, 2010. "Caps In Sequential Contests," Working Papers 1007, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Kiho Yoon, 2012. "On asymmetry in all-pay auctions," Discussion Paper Series 1208, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
- Kline, Brendan, 2009. "A restriction on lobbyist donations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 129-132, September.
- Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020. "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Zhonghao Shui, 2023.
"Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 925-951, September.
- Zhonghao Shui, 2019. "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," KIER Working Papers 1008, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Kirkegaard, René, 2012. "Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 226-248.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023.
"Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 983-1007, May.
- Tuvana Pastine & Ivan Pastine, 2021. "Equilibrium Existence and Expected Payoffs in All-Pay Auctions with Constraints," Economics Department Working Paper Series n311-21.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Blackstone, Erwin A. & Buck, Andrew J. & Hakim, Simon, 2004. "Privatizing adoption and foster care: Applying auction and market solutions," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 1033-1049, November.
- Kirkegaard Rene, 2008. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, September.
- Rene Kirkegaard, 2008. "Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps," Working Papers 0805, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
- Lagziel, David, 2019.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 416-422.
- David Lagziel, 2018. "Credit Auctions And Bid Caps," Working Papers 1810, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2012. "All-pay contests with constraints," Working Papers 201204, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
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Keywords
All-pay auctions;JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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