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Sequential two-prize contests

  • Aner Sela

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    We study a two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model with two players where each player’s marginal values for the prizes are decreasing, constant, or increasing. We also analyze an equilibrium of the model with more than two players where each player’s marginal values for the prizes are nonincreasing. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-010-0547-9
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 383-395

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:2:p:383-395
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    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CEPR Discussion Papers 5205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions," Discussion Papers 2005/8, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Luski, Israel & Wettstein, David, 2003. "Innovative activity and sunk cost," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1111-1133, October.
    4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2008. "Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1211, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
    6. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November.
    7. Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
    9. Cohen, Chen & Kaplan, Todd & Sela, Aner, 2004. "Optimal Rewards in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 4704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
    11. Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper G. de, 2009. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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