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Laurent Lamy

Personal Details

First Name:Laurent
Middle Name:
Last Name:Lamy
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pla326
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2007 Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)

Paris, France
http://www.centre-cired.fr/

: +33 (0)1 43 94 73 73
+33 (0)1 43 94 73 70
Jardin d'Agronomie Tropicale de Paris, 45 bis Avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex
RePEc:edi:ciredfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Olivier Compte & Lamy Laurent & Laurent Emmanuel, 2017. "Marchés et allotissement : regroupement ou dégroupement ?," Post-Print halshs-01513319, HAL.
  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," CEPR Discussion Papers 11564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Laurent Lamy, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel)," Post-Print hal-01688249, HAL.
  5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2015. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 10758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01206167, HAL.
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754581, HAL.
  10. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
  11. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Post-Print halshs-00754414, HAL.
  12. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," Post-Print halshs-00754436, HAL.
  13. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
  14. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564887, HAL.
  15. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Post-Print halshs-00754404, HAL.
  16. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  17. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586068, HAL.
  18. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
  19. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions : Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions," Working Papers 2007-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  20. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "On the Comparative Statics of the Optimal Reserve Price : A Comment on "Reserve price Signaling"," Working Papers 2007-23, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  21. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  22. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes," Working Papers 2007-28, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

Articles

  1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  2. Olivier Compte & Laurent Lamy & Emmanuel Laurent, 2017. "Marchés et allotissement : regroupement ou dégroupement ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(2), pages 141-162.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
  4. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
  5. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
  6. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  7. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
  8. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July.
  9. Lamy, Laurent, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2498-2504, November.
  10. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2016. "Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688231, HAL.

  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2015. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 10758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Post-Print hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688231, HAL.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Felix Bierbrauer, 2016. "Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01206167, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Post-Print hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2016. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7pu0mfr14h9, Sciences Po.
    3. Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688231, HAL.
    5. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B. & Kaplan, Todd, 2017. "Protection in government procurement auctions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 134-142.

  4. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Lovo, Stefano & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2017. "No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 142-144.
    4. Eda Gülşen & Erdal Özmen, 2017. "Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis," ERC Working Papers 1714, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Nov 2017.

  5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Post-Print hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Working Papers 25/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.

  6. Laurent Lamy, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754581, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

  7. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Post-Print hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Guillaume Plantin & Jean Tirole, 2016. "Marking to Market versus Taking to Market," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7pu0mfr14h9, Sciences Po.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  8. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Post-Print halshs-00754414, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Niedermayer, Andreas & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pia, 2015. "Foreclosure Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 522, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  9. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," Post-Print halshs-00754436, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Vohra, Rakesh V., 2015. "Combinatorial Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    2. Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, "undated". "Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    3. Muto, Nozomu & Yasuhiro, Shirata, 2013. "Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions," Discussion Papers 2013-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
    5. Sano, Ryuji, 2013. "Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 112-117.
    6. Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.

  10. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Post-Print hal-01688318, HAL.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel, 2016. "On the benefits of set-asides," Post-Print hal-01688231, HAL.
    4. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

  11. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564887, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.

  12. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Post-Print halshs-00754404, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00840844, HAL.
    3. Subir Bose & Arup Daripa, 2014. "Shills and Shipes," Discussion Papers in Economics 14/12, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    4. Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2017. "The Economics of Vendor Bids," ERC Working Papers 1711, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    5. Nikitkov, Alexey & Bay, Darlene, 2015. "Shill bidding: Empirical evidence of its effectiveness and likelihood of detection in online auction systems," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 42-54.
    6. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 9791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    8. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

  13. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal, 2012. "Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 439-456.
    2. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.

  14. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Jihui Chen & Maochao Xu, 2015. "Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 625-640, July.
    3. Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
    4. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard, 2015. "Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders," Working Papers 1502, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.

  15. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts," Working Papers 2007-25, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

    Cited by:

    1. Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey vs. the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," 2007 Meeting Papers 427, Society for Economic Dynamics.

Articles

  1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June. See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999. See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Laurent Lamy, 2010. "Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 503-510, July. See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Lamy, Laurent, 2010. "Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2498-2504, November. See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2014-06-02 2015-08-25 2016-10-23 2017-07-23 2017-07-23. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (2) 2011-02-19 2011-02-19
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2014-06-02 2017-07-23
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2011-02-19 2015-08-25
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2017-07-23 2017-07-23
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2011-02-19 2017-07-23
  7. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (2) 2015-08-25 2017-07-23
  8. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (1) 2016-07-23

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