Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2016. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," TSE Working Papers 16-695, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2020.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print hal-03544026, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August.
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva & Kusterer, David J, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8167, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2011. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 02-02, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021.
"Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations],"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2015. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEIS Research Paper 358, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 22 Oct 2015.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print hal-03544026, HAL.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2016. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," TSE Working Papers 16-695, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2020.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 533-536.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 9676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 53712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
- Kremer, Michael R., 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Scholarly Articles 3693705, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Viktor Slavtchev & Simon Wiederhold, 2016.
"Does the Technological Content of Government Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 45-84, April.
- Slavtchev, Viktor & Wiederhold, Simon, 2014. "Does the Technological Content of Government Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States," IWH Discussion Papers 10/2014, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1988.
"Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 516-537, Winter.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1987. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity With an Application to Takeovers," Working papers 463, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1988. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers," Working Papers 675, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Lichtenberg, Frank R, 1988. "The Private R&D Investment Response to Federal Design and Technical Competitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 550-559, June.
- Roberto Burguet & Yeon-Koo Che, 2004. "Competitive Procurement with Corruption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 50-68, Spring.
- Roberto Burguet, 2017.
"Procurement Design with Corruption,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 315-341, May.
- Roberto Burguet, 2015. "Procurement Design with Corruption," Working Papers 798, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Bennett, John & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2006.
"Building and managing facilities for public services,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2143-2160, November.
- John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 02-08, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- JOhn Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2005. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/137, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Bennett, John & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 22, Royal Economic Society.
- John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2004. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Public Policy Discussion Papers 02-08, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995.
"Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral," Papers 152, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013.
"Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," MPRA Paper 41966, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 65-90, Fall.
- Eric Maskin, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Branco, Fernando, 2002. "Procurement favouritism and technology adoption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-91, January.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
- Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rey, Patrick, 2003. "Moral Hazard, Collusion and Group Lending," IDEI Working Papers 122, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015.
"On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2595-2643, August.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," Post-Print halshs-01206167, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01206167, HAL.
- John T. Hodges & Georgina Dellacha, 2007. "Unsolicited infrastructure proposals : how some countries introduce competition and transparency," World Bank Publications - Reports 10718, The World Bank Group.
- Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & R. Richard Geddes, 2020. "Do Public-Private-Partnership-Enabling Laws Increase Private Investment in Transportation Infrastructure?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 43-70.
- Christian Terwiesch & Yi Xu, 2008. "Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(9), pages 1529-1543, September.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Optimal auction design and R&D," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1655-1674, December.
- Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino & Iozzi, Alberto, 2017. "Public procurement with unverifiable quality: The case for discriminatory competitive procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 14-26.
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004.
"Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1276, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment incentives in procurement auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9005, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cantillon, Estelle & Arozamena, Leandro, 2001. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Piccione, Michele & Tan, Guofu, 1996. "Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(3), pages 663-685, August.
- Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-890, September.
- Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2009.
"Preferred suppliers in auction markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 283-295, June.
- Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," Working Papers 355, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 752.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1971-2003.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Legros, 2004.
"Auditing and Property Rights,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 356-372, Summer.
- Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Legros, 2004. "Auditing and property rights," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7028, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Yan, Jianye & Yu, Jun, 2015. "Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 96-106.
- Isaiah Andrews & Daniel Barron, 2016. "The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2742-2759, September.
- Michael Kremer, 1998.
"Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(4), pages 1137-1167.
- Michael Kremer, 1997. "Patent Buy-Outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," NBER Working Papers 6304, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Cabral, Luis & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Cozzi, Guido & Zanza, Matteo & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 2006. "Procuring Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- , R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
- Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999.
"Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
- Che, Y.K. & Hausch, D.B., 1997. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," Working papers 9714, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Marina Halac & Navin Kartik & Qingmin Liu, 2017. "Contests for Experimentation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(5), pages 1523-1569.
- repec:hal:pseose:hal-00812781 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733, September.
- Jeffrey Clemens & Parker Rogers, 2020.
"Demand Shocks, Procurement Policies, and the Nature of Medical Innovation: Evidence from Wartime Prosthetic Device Patents,"
NBER Working Papers
26679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey P. Clemens & Parker Rogers, 2020. "Demand Shocks, Procurement Policies, and the Nature of Medical Innovation: Evidence from Wartime Prosthetic Device Patents," CESifo Working Paper Series 8781, CESifo.
- Guido Cozzi & Giammario Impullitti, 2010.
"Government Spending Composition, Technical Change, and Wage Inequality,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(6), pages 1325-1358, December.
- Guido Cozzi & Giammario Impullitti, 2008. "Government spending composition, technical change and wage inequality," Working Papers 2009_02, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01206167 is not listed on IDEAS
- Koh, Youngwoo, 2017. "Incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 393-426.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2015. "Trust, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CESifo Working Paper Series 5229, CESifo.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
- Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2007. "Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 631-641, June.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Simon Board, 2011. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3349-3367, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020.
"Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2194-2212, May.
- Schmidt, Klaus & Herweg, Fabian, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 12385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 47, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Martimort, David & Arve, Malin, 2023. "Auctioning Long-Term Projects under Financial Constraints," TSE Working Papers 23-1469, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2024.
- David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020.
"Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
- Yu Chen & David Michael Rietzke, 2016. "Push or pull? Performance pay, incentives, and information," Working Papers 127987900, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2018. "Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information," Graz Economics Papers 2018-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Alejandro Francetich, 2023. "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 363-399, June.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021.
"Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation [Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations],"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2149-2178.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2015. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEIS Research Paper 358, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 22 Oct 2015.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Che, Yeon-Koo & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2021. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," Post-Print hal-03544026, HAL.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2016. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," TSE Working Papers 16-695, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2020.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021.
"Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 179-206, March.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021. "Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 8863, CESifo.
- Ehtisham Ahmad & Annalisa Vinella & Kezhou Xiao, 2018. "Contracting arrangements and public private partnerships for sustainable development," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 42(2), pages 145-169.
- Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2021.
"The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1059-1087, October.
- Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2018. "The Role of Budget Contraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1777, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Vivek Bhattacharya, 2021. "An Empirical Model of R&D Procurement Contests: An Analysis of the DOD SBIR Program," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2189-2224, September.
- Meng Wei Chen & Yu Chen & Zhen-Hua Wu & Ningru Zhao, 2018. "Government Intervention, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship," Graz Economics Papers 2018-15, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Francesco Decarolis & Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Emilio Raiteri & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021.
"Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from US military R&D contracts,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 697-720, November.
- Francesco Decarolis & Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Emilio Raiteri & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from U.S. military R&D contracts," Working Papers 18, Chair of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Elisabetta Iossa & Federico Biagi & Paola Valbonesi, 2018.
"Pre-commercial procurement, procurement of innovative solutions and innovation partnerships in the EU: rationale and strategy,"
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(8), pages 730-749, November.
- Elisabetta Iossa, Federico Biagi and Paola Valbonesi, 2016. "Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy," IEFE Working Papers 89, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021.
"Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre Boyer, 2016. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," Working Papers 2016-37, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Chiappinelli, Olga & Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2023. "Public procurement as an innovation policy: Where do we stand?," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-002, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019.
"Efficient investments in the implementation problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
- Kentaro Tomoeda, 2018. "Efficient Investments in the Implementation Problem," Working Paper Series 54, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Rosar, Frank & Mueller, Florian, 2014. "Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
- Vivek Bhattacharya, 2021. "An Empirical Model of R&D Procurement Contests: An Analysis of the DOD SBIR Program," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2189-2224, September.
- Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2021.
"How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 238-266, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," MPRA Paper 95615, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rosar, Frank & Mueller, Florian, 2015. "Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 259-280.
- Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 120, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with investment [Wettkämpfe mit Investitionen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-09, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004.
"Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1276, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment incentives in procurement auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9005, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cantillon, Estelle & Arozamena, Leandro, 2001. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Galasso, Alberto & Mitchell, Matthew & Virag, Gabor, 2018.
"A theory of grand innovation prizes,"
Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 343-362.
- Galasso, Alberto & Virag, Gabor & Mitchell, Matthew, 2017. "A Theory of Grand Innovation Prizes," CEPR Discussion Papers 11860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012.
"Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Andreas Asseyer, "undated". "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015002, Berlin School of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004.
"Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In,"
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 2004. "Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19316, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020.
"Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
- Yu Chen & David Michael Rietzke, 2016. "Push or pull? Performance pay, incentives, and information," Working Papers 127987900, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2018. "Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information," Graz Economics Papers 2018-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Simon Wiederhold, 2012. "The Role of Public Procurement in Innovation: Theory and Empirical Evidence," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 43.
- Onur Bayar & Thomas J. Chemmanur & Mark H. Liu, "undated". "How to Motivate Fundamental Innovation: Subsidies versus Prizes and the Role of Venture Capital," Working Papers 0175fin, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio, revised 06 Jan 2016.
More about this item
Keywords
Contract rights; Inducement Prizes; Innovation; Procurement and R&D.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O39 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Other
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-11-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2015-11-01 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2015-11-01 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-INO-2015-11-01 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2015-11-01 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2015-11-01 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:358. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Barbara Piazzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csrotit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.