Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
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- Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2015. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEIS Research Paper 358, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 22 Oct 2015.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2018. "Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information Search," Graz Economics Papers 2018-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsContract rights; Inducement Prizes; Innovation; Procurement and R&D;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O39 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Other
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-09-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-09-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2016-09-25 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-INO-2016-09-25 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2016-09-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2016-09-25 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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