Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
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- Gong, Jiong & Li, Jianpei & McAfee, R. Preston, 2012. "Split-award contracts with investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 188-197.
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- Veronika Grimm & Friederike Mengel & Giovanni Ponti & Lari Arthur Viianto, 2006. "Investment Incentives in Auctions: An Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 26, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
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- Nicolás Figueroa & Gonzalo Cisternas, 2007. "Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions," Documentos de Trabajo 230, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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- Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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