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Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from U.S. military R&D contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Decarolis

    (Bocconi University)

  • Gaetan de Rassenfosse

    (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne)

  • Leonardo M. Giuffrida

    (ZEW)

  • Elisabetta Iossa

    (University of Rome Tor Vergata)

  • Vincenzo Mollisi

    (University of Mannheim)

  • Emilio Raiteri

    (Eindhoven University of Technology)

  • Giancarlo Spagnolo

    (Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

This study provides the first quantification of buyers' role in the outcome of R&D procurement contracts. We combine together four data sources on US federal R&D contracts, follow-on patented inventions, federal public workforce characteristics, and perception of their work environement. By exploiting the observability of deaths of federal employees, we find that managers' death events negatively affect innovation outcomes: a 1 percent increase in the share of relevant public officer deaths causes a decline of 32.3 percent of patents per contract, 20.5 percent patent citations per contract and 34.3 percent patent claims per contract. These effects are driven by the deaths occurring in the six months before the contract is awarded, thereby indicating the relevance of the design and award stage relative to ex-post contract monitoring. Lower levels of self-reported within-office cooperation also negatively impact R&D outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Decarolis & Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Emilio Raiteri & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from U.S. military R&D contracts," Working Papers 18, Chair of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:iip:wpaper:18
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    Cited by:

    1. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lotti, Clarissa & Muco, Arieda & Valletti, Tommaso, 2022. "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 17019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Cappelletti, Matilde & Giuffrida, Leonardo M., 2022. "Targeted bidders in government tenders," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Raiteri, Emilio, 2021. "Buyers' workload and R&D procurement outcomes: Evidence from the US Air Force Research Lab," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-059, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Tukiainen, Janne & Blesse, Sebastian & Bohne, Albrecht & Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Jääskeläinen, Jan & Luukinen, Ari & Sieppi, Antti, 2021. "What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-033, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022. "Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 980-1019, November.
    6. Chiappinelli, Olga & Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2023. "Public procurement as an innovation policy: Where do we stand?," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-002, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Clarissa Lotti & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2022. "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," CEIS Research Paper 532, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 01 Feb 2022.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    innovation; R&D; public procurement; patents; bureaucracy; competence; cooperation; state capacity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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