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Effizienz in der Verteidigungsbeschaffung: Best Practices für Europas Sicherheit

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  • Carril, Rodrigo

Abstract

Europa steht vor einem historischen Anstieg der Ausgaben für Verteidigung und Sicherheit. Werden diese zusätzlichen Mittel gut geplant, verteilt und eingesetzt, kann dies die europäischen Verteidigungsfähigkeiten grundlegend verändern und die industrielle Basis der europäischen Verteidigung neu ausrichten. Wird dieser Umsetzungsprozess schlecht gestaltet, droht Europa Milliarden für veraltete und teure Ausrüstung zu verschwenden - mit nur geringen Verbesserungen der militärischen Leistungsfähigkeit. Die Anwendung zentraler ökonomischer Erkenntnisse aus der Mechanismusdesign-Theorie und Best Practices aus der Beschaffung ist entscheidend für den Erfolg. Dieser Report bündelt die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse aus der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung, um militärische Fähigkeiten, wirtschaftliche Resilienz und Innovationskraft Europas pro eingesetztem Euro zu maximieren. (i) Die innovationsorientierte Beschaffung muss ins Zentrum der europäischen Verteidigungsstrategie rücken. Empirische Evidenz aus US-Programmen zeigt, dass autonome, flexible Agenturen mit hochqualifizierten Programmmanagerinnen und -managern, bottom-up Projektselektion und aktivem Projektmanagement gegenüber starren, hierarchisch gesteuerten Systemen überlegen sind. Besonders wirksam ist dabei eine Kombination aus angebotsseitiger Förderung von Forschung und Entwicklung und nachfrageseitigen Anreizen durch verbindliche Abnahme- und Kaufzusagen. (ii) Europa muss sich auf Nachfragespitzen im Konfliktfall vorbereiten und durch Verträge entlang der gesamten Wertschöpfungskette die entsprechenden Produktionskapazitäten sichern. Die zukünftige Skalierbarkeit der Produktion, sinkende Stückkosten sowie robuste Lieferketten und die gesicherte Verfügbarkeit kritischer Vorprodukte müssen zentrale Be standteile dieser Strategie sein. (iii) Wirksame Beschaffungsprozesse erfordern gut ausgebildete und kompetente Einkäuferinnen und Einkäufer mit ausreichendem Entscheidungsspielraum, kombiniert mit starker ex-post-Rechenschaftspflicht. In der Praxis erweisen sich Flexibilität und Ermessen häufig als überlegen gegenüber starren ex-ante-Regeln und einer übermäßigen Spezifikation in langsamen bürokratischen Verfahren. Für standardisierte Güter wie Munition haben sich wettbewerbliche Auktionen und Festpreisverträge bewährt. (iv) Auf europäischer Ebene spricht viel für eine Zentralisierung der Verteidigungsbeschaffung. Ein einheitlicher europäischer Markt für Verteidigungsgüter würde erhebliche Kosteneinsparungen ermöglichen, die industrielle Basis Europas stärken, die Interoperabilität zwischen den Streitkräften erhöhen und die Koordinierung von Forschung und Entwicklung sowie von Investitionen in Spitzen- und Reservekapazitäten verbessern.

Suggested Citation

  • Carril, Rodrigo, 2026. "Effizienz in der Verteidigungsbeschaffung: Best Practices für Europas Sicherheit," Kiel Reports 6, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkrp:336808
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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