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Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds

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  • Ján Palguta
  • Filip Pertold

Abstract

We present evidence of how policies that create opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement lead to the manipulation of procurement values. We exploit a policy reform in which public bodies were given the autonomy to preselect potential contractors below newly defined discretionary thresholds. Manipulation is revealed through bunching of procurements just below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser degree, in goods. Among manipulated contracts, we document a threefold increase in the probability that procurements are allocated to anonymous firms, which can hide their owners. This sorting violates assumptions behind regression-discontinuity designs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ján Palguta & Filip Pertold, 2017. "Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 293-315, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:293-315
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150511
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L74 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Construction

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