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Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering

  • Eva I. Hoppe
  • Patrick W. Schmitz

A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The government agency's preferred mode of provision depends on the information gathering costs, the costs of innovation efforts, and on the degree to which effort is contractible.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1756-2171.12010
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Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 44 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 56-74

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Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:44:y:2013:i:1:p:56-74
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