Task Interdependence and Noncontractibility in Public-Good Provision
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References listed on IDEAS
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods,"
Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," MPRA Paper 41730, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks,"
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- Chen, Bin R. & Chiu, Y. Stephen, 2010. "Public-private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 591-603, November.
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- Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2004. "Hold-up and Sequential Specific Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 386-400, Summer.
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- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015.
"Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, pages 23-31.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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