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Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation?

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  • Fahad Khalil
  • Doyoung Kim
  • Dongsoo Shin

Abstract

"Integrating planning and implementation, by having one agent perform both tasks, may be effective in encouraging planning activity whose outcome is not observable. Emphasizing its information-generating role, we find that planning activity is best encouraged by partially integrating the tasks. This is because the value of information is nonmonotonic in the degree of task integration. Therefore, the threat of using a second agent to implement the project may relax the moral hazard constraint associated with the planning task. The project size is distorted to increase the value of information, and there can be overinvestment relative to the first best." Copyright 2006, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2006. "Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation?," Working Papers UWEC-2003-01-P, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2003-01-p
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    Cited by:

    1. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
    2. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
    3. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011. "Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1094-1108.
    4. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
    6. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
    7. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
    9. Kim, Doyoung, 2013. "Delegation of information verification," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 488-500.
    10. Peter-J. Jost & Frauke Lammers, 2010. "Organization of Project Evaluation and Implementation under Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 212-238, June.
    11. Laux, Volker, 2008. "On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 625-635, March.
    12. Raffaele Fiocco, 2012. "Competition and regulation with product differentiation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 287-307, December.
    13. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015. "Merger efficiency and managerial incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
    14. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," CEPR Discussion Papers 4572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Matthias Kräkel & Daniel Müller, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse02_2014, University of Bonn, Germany.
    16. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
    18. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
    19. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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