Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships
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DOI: j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x
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- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," Post-Print hal-00813153, HAL.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2011. "Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1104, CEPREMAP.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00813153, HAL.
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