Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality
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- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D., 2007.
"Sharing and anti-sharing in teams,"
Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 351-356, September.
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D, 2006. "Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt07z8m8wm, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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- Roland Kirstein & Robert Cooter, "undated". "Anti-Sharing," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1131, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert, 2003. "Anti-Sharing," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2003-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert, 2005. "Anti-Sharing," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Choi, Yoon K., 2001. "Management turnover and executive compensation in synergistic takeovers," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 223-238.
- Rankin, Frederick W. & Sayre, Todd L., 2000. "The effects of performance separability and contract type on agent effort," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 683-695, October.
- Choi, Yoon K. & Merville, Larry J., 1995. "Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 27-33, January.
- Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D, 2006. "Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4441r9r1, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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