Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams
Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.
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- Cooter, Robert D. & Porat, Ariel, 2002. "Anti-Insurance," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1vw0d9sf, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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