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Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams

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  • Bose, Arup
  • Pal, Debashis
  • Sappington, David E.M.

Abstract

We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents' individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents' contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.

Suggested Citation

  • Bose, Arup & Pal, Debashis & Sappington, David E.M., 2010. "Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 947-961, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:54:y:2010:i:7:p:947-961
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Butler & Liam J. A. Lenten & Patrick Massey, 2020. "Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(5), pages 539-550, November.
    2. Hattori, Keisuke & Yamada, Mai, 2023. "Closing the Psychological Distance: The Effect of Social Interactions on Team Performance," MPRA Paper 117042, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Keisuke Hattori & Mai Yamada, 2020. "Effective Leadership Selection in Complementary Teams," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(4), pages 620-639.
    4. Matthew McGinty, 2014. "Strategic Incentives in Teams: Implications of Returns to Scale," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 474-488, October.
    5. Yigal Gerchak & Christian Schmid, 2022. "Principal–agent models where a principal is only affected by extreme performances," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(2), pages 468-477, March.
    6. Huseyin Yildirim, 2023. "Who fares better in teamwork?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 299-324, June.
    7. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Crutzen, Benoît SY & Flamand, Sabine, 2017. "Prize allocation and incentives in team contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 12493, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Crutzen, Benoît S Y & Flamand, Sabine & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2020. "A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).

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