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  • Roland Kirstein

    (University of Saarland)

  • Robert Cooter

    (University of California, Berkeley)


Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti- Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Kirstein & Robert Cooter, "undated". "Anti-Sharing," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1131, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2005-1-1131 Note: oai:bepress:

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Choi, Yoon K., 1993. "Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 37-42.
    3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
    4. Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-1293, December.
    5. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
    6. Christoph L├╝lfesmann, 2001. "Team Production, Sequential Investments, and Stochastic Payoffs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, T├╝bingen, vol. 157(3), pages 430-430, September.
    7. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
    8. Cooter, Robert D. & Porat, Ariel, 2002. "Anti-Insurance," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1vw0d9sf, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D - Microeconomics
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

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