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Anti-Sharing

  • Roland Kirstein

    (University of Saarland)

  • Robert Cooter

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti- Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=gwp
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Paper provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its series German Working Papers in Law and Economics with number 2005-1-1131.

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Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2005-1-1131
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  1. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed}," Microeconomics 9401003, EconWPA.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
  3. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  4. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
  6. Christoph Lülfesmann, 2001. "Team Production, Sequential Investments, and Stochastic Payoffs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 430-, September.
  7. Choi, Yoon K., 1993. "Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 37-42.
  8. Cooter, Robert D. & Porat, Ariel, 2002. "Anti-Insurance," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1vw0d9sf, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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