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Anti-Teilen in Teams


  • Kirstein, Roland


Soll der gemeinsam erzeugte Output zwischen den Mitgliedern eines Teams aufgeteilt werden, so kann dies die Anreize aller Mitglieder vermindern, unbeobachtbare Anstrengung zu leisten. Weist die gemeinsame Produktionsfunktion darüber hinaus positive Kreuzableitungen auf, so ist Teamarbeit zwar besonders sinnvoll. Allerdings senkt dann die ineffiziente Anstrengung der anderen Teammitglieder die Grenzproduktivität jedes einzelnen, was die individuell rationale Anstrengung noch weiter reduziert. Der Beitrag schlägt einen simplen Vertrag vor, der diese Probleme löst: Anti-Teilung. Im Rahmen dieses Vertrages hat jedes Teammitglied Aussicht auf den gesamten Teamoutput. Hierzu muß jedes Teammitglied sich verpflichten, einen fixen Betrag zu tragen, der allerdings kleiner ist als der effiziente Output. So implementiert Anti-Teilung allseitige effiziente Anstrengung als ein Nash-Gleichgewicht. Damit dieser Vertrag glaubwürdig ist, muß ein nicht-aktiver Akteur die Rolle des Anti-Teilers übernehmen. Dies kann ein externer Akteur sein, oder aber ein Mitglied des Teams übernimmt diese Rolle (interner Anti- Teiler). Externe Anti-Teilung implementiert das First-Best-Ergebnis, interne Anti-Teilung führt dagegen zu einem niedrigeren Output (der jedoch höher ausfallen kann als unter dem Aufteilungsvertrag).

Suggested Citation

  • Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Anti-Teilen in Teams," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200404

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Susan I. Cohen & Martin Loeb, 1984. "The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 20-24, January.
    2. Christoph Lülfesmann, 2001. "Team Production, Sequential Investments, and Stochastic Payoffs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 430-430, September.
    3. Roland Kirstein, 2000. "Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 25(2), pages 251-261, April.
    4. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-555, December.
    5. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    6. Jörg Finsinger & Mark V. Pauly, 1990. "The Double Liability Rule*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 15(2), pages 159-169, September.
    7. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
    8. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-577, August.
    9. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
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    More about this item


    Strategische Komplemente; Teilungsproblem; Anti-Insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights


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