Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations
Effective monitoring requires proper incentives and detection skill. Detection skills depend on the extent of specialization in monitoring and on the number of agents to be supervised. This paper demonstrates that hierarchy and monitoring of monitors can provide the necessary incentives for the monitoring agents, which induces them to make use of their detection skill. The model draws on the theory of imperfect diagnosis and explains why hierarchies can be superior to ?lean? organizations.
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