Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Patrick Legros & Steven Matthews, 1993.
"Efficient and nearly efficient partnerships,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/7040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
- Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1991.
"Efficiency in partnerships,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/7044, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
- Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69.
- Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996.
"Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
- Ben-Porath, E. & Kahneman, M., 1993. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Papers 15-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
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