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Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring


  • Miller, Nolan H.


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  • Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:77:y:1997:i:2:p:285-299

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
    2. Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December.
    3. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
    4. Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
    6. Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69.
    7. Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
    8. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Björn Bartling & Ferdinand A. von Siemens, 2010. "Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 299-320, June.
    2. Özgür Kıbrıs & Arzu Kıbrıs, 2016. "On surplus-sharing in partnerships," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 89-111, June.
    3. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
    4. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
    5. Poblete, Joaquín, 2015. "Profit sharing and market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 10-18.
    6. Marx, Leslie M. & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Individual accountability in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 260-273, October.
    7. Jianpei Li, 2009. "Team production with inequity-averse agents," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 8(2), pages 119-136, August.
    8. Ferreyra, Maria Marta & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2012. "Information asymmetry and equilibrium monitoring in education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 237-254.
    9. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2009. "Efficient tournaments within teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 103-119.
    10. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    11. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
    12. Ekaterina Goldfayn, 2006. "Organization of R&D With Two Agents and Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2006, University of Bonn, Germany.
    13. Huddart, Steven & Liang, Pierre Jinghong, 2005. "Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 153-187, December.
    14. Alex Gershkov & Eyal Winter, 2015. "Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 27-44, May.
    15. Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul, 2006. "Collective Production and Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 186, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    16. Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 2012. "Information extraction and norms of mutual protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 154-162.

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