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Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Author

Listed:
  • Björn Bartling
  • Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Abstract

Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are most frequently shared equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity-averse partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the partners' incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversion can enhance efficiency in partnerships of given size, but that it can also cause partnerships to be inefficiently small.

Suggested Citation

  • Björn Bartling & Ferdinand A. von Siemens, 2010. "Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 299-320, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201006)166:2_299:esrip_2.0.tx_2-o
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pedro Rey-Biel, 2008. "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 297-320, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms

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