Team production with inequity-averse agents
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References listed on IDEAS
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- De Marco, Giuseppe & Immordino, Giovanni, 2013. "Partnership, reciprocity and team design," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 39-58.
- Key, Nigel D. & Sneeringer, Stacy & Marquardt, David, 2014. "Climate Change, Heat Stress, and U.S. Dairy Production," Economic Research Report 186731, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
More about this item
KeywordsMoral hazard; Team production; Inequity aversion; C7; D7; D63; L2;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
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