Team production with inequity-averse agents
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Volume (Year): 8 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2009. "Efficient tournaments within teams," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 103-119.
- Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
- Hideshi Itoh, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 18-45.
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- Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
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