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Team Production, Sequential Investments, and Stochastic Payoffs

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  • Christoph Lülfesmann

Abstract

This paper investigates a team production problem where two parties invest sequentially to generate a joint surplus. We find that the first best can be implemented even if the investment return is highly uncertain. The optimal contract entails a basic dichotomy: it is a simple option contract if investments of both parties are substitutive, and a linear incentive contract if they are complementary. These arrangements can be interpreted in terms of asset ownership, and renegotiation arises in equilibrium after the first agent has invested.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Lülfesmann, 2001. "Team Production, Sequential Investments, and Stochastic Payoffs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 430-430, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200109)157:3_430:tpsias_2.0.tx_2-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nautz, D., 1995. "Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 301-306, June.
    2. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
    3. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
    4. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
    5. Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
    6. Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 337-351, March.
    7. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-764.
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    Cited by:

    1. Keuschnigg, Christian, 2003. "Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3850, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Anti-Teilen in Teams," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Roland Kirstein & Robert Cooter, "undated". "Anti-Sharing," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1131, Berkeley Electronic Press.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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