Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example
This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary rather than coerced activity of the followers. This paper considers how a leader induces rational followers to follow her in situations when the leader has incentives to mislead her followers.
|Date of creation:||14 Jan 1997|
|Note:||Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on IBM PC; to print on Postscript; pages: 38 ; figures: none|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
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