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A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation

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  • Crutzen, Benoît S Y
  • Flamand, Sabine
  • Sahuguet, Nicolas

Abstract

We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.

Suggested Citation

  • Crutzen, Benoît S Y & Flamand, Sabine & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2020. "A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:182:y:2020:i:c:s0047272719301719
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu, 2021. "Endogenous alliances in survival contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 337-358.
    2. Gary W. Cox & Jon H. Fiva & Daniel M. Smith & Rune J. Sørensen, 2020. "Moral Hazard in Electoral Teams," CESifo Working Paper Series 8357, CESifo.
    3. Jon H. Fiva & Federica Izzo & Janne Tukiainen, 2024. "The Gatekeeper’s Dilemma: Political Selection or Team Effort," Discussion Papers 164, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Bruckner, Dominik & Sahm, Marco, 2023. "Party Politics: A Contest Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277714, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2021. "Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 205-221, February.
    6. Hideo Konishi & Nicolas Sahuguet & Benoit Crutzen, 2023. "Allocation Rules of Indivisible Prizes in Team Contests," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1064, Boston College Department of Economics.
    7. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
    8. Avidit Acharya & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2022. "Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0293, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    9. Cox, Gary W. & Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. & Sørensen, Rune J., 2021. "Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Open lists; Closed lists; Proportional representation; Contests; Multiple prizes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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