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Turnout with Polarization and Campaign Spending

Author

Listed:
  • Pau Balart

    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

  • Agustín Casas

    (Universidad CUNEF)

  • Gerard Doménech-Gironell

    (University of Padova)

  • Orestis Troumpounis

    (Ca Foscari University of Venice)

Abstract

This paper develops a formal model of electoral competition in which parties first choose their platforms and then allocate campaign resources that serve both persuasive and mobilization purposes. Voters, in turn, endogenously sort into ideological and impressionable types. We characterize a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and derive comparative statics that illustrate how the returns to mobilization and persuasion shape equilibrium platforms, campaign spending, and turnout. Among other results, we show that while campaign spending and polarization do not necessarily move in the same direction, turnout consistently increases with polarization.

Suggested Citation

  • Pau Balart & Agustín Casas & Gerard Doménech-Gironell & Orestis Troumpounis, 2025. "Turnout with Polarization and Campaign Spending," Working Papers 371, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:371
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/371.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March.
    3. Timothy Feddersen & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "A Theory of Participation in Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1271-1282, September.
    4. Crutzen, Benoît S Y & Flamand, Sabine & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2020. "A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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