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Report NEP-CDM-2025-09-22
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- Patrick Lederer, 2025, "Robust Voting Rules on the Interval Domain," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2509.04874, Sep.
- Pau Balart & Agustín Casas & Gerard Doménech-Gironell & Orestis Troumpounis, 2025, "Turnout with Polarization and Campaign Spending," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 371, Sep.
- Santiago López Moskovits, 2025, "There is Something in the Water: The Effects of a Bad Government on Voter Turnout," Young Researchers Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, number 16, Aug, revised Aug 2025.
- Masahiko ASANO & Yoshikuni ONO & Yuya ENDO, 2025, "The Strategic Smile: Gendered facial expressions in electoral campaigns," Discussion papers, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), number 25088, Sep.
- Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2025, "Political Capitalism vs the Public Interest: Influence in the Presence of Checks and Balances," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 12136.
- Miriam Malament, 2025, "Do Symbolic Penalties Work? Evidence from Compulsory Voting Laws in Argentina," Young Researchers Working Papers, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, number 17, Sep, revised Sep 2025.
- Natalia Jiménez-Jiménez & Elena Molis-Bañales & Ángel Solano-García, 2025, "Tax avoidance and voting on income redistribution: A real-effort task experiment," Working Papers, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, number 25.07.
- Matilda Gettins & Lorenz Meister, 2025, "Who Pays for Climate Policy? Distributional Narratives and Populist Backlash," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 2139.