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Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

  • Dirk Schindler
  • Guttorm Schjelderup

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2006/wp-cesifo-2006-04/cesifo1_wp1702.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1702.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1702
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  1. Rauscher, Michael, 1998. "Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 59-67, July.
  2. Steen, F & Sorgard, L, 1996. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian Cement Market," Papers 10/96, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  3. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  4. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March.
  5. Jürgen Meckl, 1996. "Market power of firms and exchange-rate fluctuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 57-77, February.
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  8. Scherer, Frederic Michael, 1996. "International trade and competition policy," ZEW Discussion Papers 96-18, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  9. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May.
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  12. Kenneth A. Froot & Paul Klemperer, 1988. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters," NBER Working Papers 2542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. King, Stephen P, 1997. "National Competition Policy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 73(222), pages 270-84, September.
  14. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
  15. Lommerund, K.E. & Sorgard, L., 1998. "Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0198, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  16. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  17. Michael Keen & Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, . "When is Policy Harmonisation Desirable?," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  18. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
  19. Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 2001. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries and Cartel Unity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(5), pages 659-674, November.
  20. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January.
  21. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June.
  22. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521027922 is not listed on IDEAS
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