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Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

  • Schindler, Dirk

    ()

    (Meteorological Institute, University of Freiburg)

  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

    ()

    (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163884
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Paper provided by Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007/8.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2007_008
Contact details of provider: Postal: NHH, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Phone: +47 55 95 92 93
Fax: +47 55 95 96 50
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/en/research-faculty/department-of-business-and-management-science.aspx
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  1. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March.
  2. Andreas Haufler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2000. "Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 283, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  4. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
  5. Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Jack Mintz, 2004. "Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It's All About Compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 221-234, 03.
  7. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
  8. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
  9. Scherer, Frederic Michael, 1996. "International trade and competition policy," ZEW Discussion Papers 96-18, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  10. Michael Keen & Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, . "When is Policy Harmonisation Desirable?," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  11. Steen, F & Sorgard, L, 1996. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian Cement Market," Papers 10/96, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  12. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January.
  13. Jürgen Meckl, 1996. "Market power of firms and exchange-rate fluctuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 57-77, February.
  14. Rauscher, Michael, 1998. "Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 59-67, July.
  15. Kenneth A. Froot & Paul Klemperer, 1988. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters," NBER Working Papers 2542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May.
  17. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June.
  18. Pinto, Brian, 1986. "Repeated games and the reciprocal dumping model of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 357-366, May.
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