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On the stability of multimarket collusion in price-setting supergames

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  • Akinbosoye, Osayi
  • Bond, Eric W.
  • Syropoulos, Constantinos

Abstract

In this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions. The model we consider is a segmented-markets duopoly with differentiated goods in which price-setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome. We find that, when goods are very close substitutes and trade costs are sufficiently high, a marginal reduction in trade costs facilitates collusion. Exactly the opposite is true if, for any given degree of product substitutability, trade costs are sufficiently low. We also study the dependence of multimarket collusion on product differentiation.

Suggested Citation

  • Akinbosoye, Osayi & Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2012. "On the stability of multimarket collusion in price-setting supergames," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 253-264.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:2:p:253-264
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.11.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Sánchez Navarro, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multimercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos," Estudios Económicos SIC 10905, Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio.
    2. Delina Agnosteva & Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto V. Yotov, 2017. "Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 6829, CESifo.
    3. Agnosteva, Delina & Syropoulos, Constantinos & Yotov, Yoto, 2020. "Preferential Trade Liberalization with Endogenous Cartel Discipline: Implications for Welfare and Optimal Trade Policies," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2020-9, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    4. Bhattacharjea, Aditya & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2015. "Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 42-50.
    5. Sánchez Navarro, Dennis, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos [Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency pro," MPRA Paper 48699, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multimarket cartels; Trade costs; Product differentiation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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