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Sustainability of collusion with imperfect price discrimination and inelastic demand functions

  • Stefano Colombo

    ()

    (Catholic University of Milan)

We study the impact of product differentiation on collusion sustainability in the case of imperfect price discrimination and inelastic demand functions. We show that differentiation facilitates the sustainability of collusion. Therefore, the indifference result of Gupta and Venkatu (2002) does not hold when imperfect price discrimination is introduced.

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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 1687-1694

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00132
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