Quality of Information and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination
We investigate how the endogenous acquisition of information, of a certain quality level, on consumers' willingness to pay (location) affects the equilibrium prices and welfare in a spatial price discrimination model. By varying the information quality we are able to obtain the equilibrium in the game for all levels of price discrimination and in the limit the case of perfect price discrimination. This gives us insights about equilibrium behavior in markets where: 1) Information on consumer characteristics is used by the firms to facilitate price discrimination and 2) The quality of information is constantly improving due to advances of the information technology (IT).
|Date of creation:||06 Mar 2002|
|Date of revision:||06 Mar 2002|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC; TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 48 ; figures: included. A previous version of this paper was titled ``Endogenous acquisition of information on consumer willingness to pay in a product differentiated duopoly.''|
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