IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jemstr/v20y2011i3p739-775.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Author

Listed:
  • Yuk‐fai Fong
  • Qihong Liu

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuk‐fai Fong & Qihong Liu, 2011. "Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 739-775, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:3:p:739-775
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "The Welfare Cost of Factor Taxation in a Perfect-Foresight Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 675-709, August.
    2. Andrea Prat & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Games Played Through Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 989-1026.
    3. Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Deneckere, Raymond J., 1989. "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 18-46.
    4. Schipper, Katherine & Smith, Abbie, 1983. "Effects of recontracting on shareholder wealth : The case of voluntary spin-offs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 437-467.
    5. Fershtman, Chaim & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Unobserved Delegation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 763-774, November.
    6. Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 33-53.
    7. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 1-31.
    8. Guesnerie, Roger & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1993. "(De)stabilizing speculation on futures markets : An alternative view point," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1043-1063, June.
    9. Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 196-232.
    10. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 251-268.
    11. Miles, James A & Rosenfeld, James D, 1983. " The Effect of Voluntary Spin-Off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1597-1606, December.
    12. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, pages 84-105.
    13. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1992. "Cost Padding, Auditing and Collusion," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, pages 205-226.
    14. Rochet, J. C., 1985. "The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 113-128, April.
    15. Rosenfeld, James D, 1984. " Additional Evidence on the Relation between Divestiture Announcements and Shareholder Wealth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(5), pages 1437-1448, December.
    16. David Martimort, 1992. "Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, pages 1-37.
    17. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1757, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    18. Melumad, Nahum & Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "A theory of responsibility centers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 445-484.
    19. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 927-940.
    20. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chongwoo Choe & Stephen King & Noriaki Matsushima, 2017. "Pricing with Cookies: Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Spatial Competition," Monash Economics Working Papers 07-17, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    2. Els Breugelmans & Tammo Bijmolt & Jie Zhang & Leonardo Basso & Matilda Dorotic & Praveen Kopalle & Alec Minnema & Willem Mijnlieff & Nancy Wünderlich, 2015. "Advancing research on loyalty programs: a future research agenda," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 127-139, June.
    3. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2016. "Llavador, Humberto G., Roemer, John E. and Silvestre, Joaquim: Sustainability for a warming planet," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 85-88.
    4. Rasch, Alexander & Gössl, Florian, 2016. "The scope for collusion under different pricing schemes," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145759, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:3:p:739-775. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.