Standardization and the Stability of Collusion
We characterize the interplay between firms’ decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms’ decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.
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|Date of creation:||Jun 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Economics Letters. March 1998; 58(3): 303-10|
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Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/
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- Martin, Stephen, 1996. "R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 733-741, April.
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